Scientists’ responses to global financial turbulence by Ramsden, Jeremy J.
© 2008 Collegium Basilea & AMSIJournal of Biological Physics and Chemistry 8 (2008) 109–110
Received  31 December 2008
109
30RA08E________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Scientists’ responses to global financial turbulence
Tradition has established that the annual editorial of this
journal appears in the September issue. But these are
exceptional times, and as the depths of the crisis
engendered by financial turbulence unfolds, many
scientists are asking what can they do to alleviate the
gloomy world economic outlook.
The immediate response to the question is that
scientists should surely continue to work as normal,
upholding the values of truth, integrity, impartiality, rigour
and objectivity intrinsic to their profession. Since so much
of the present difficulty is due to hyperbole lapped up by
gullible investors who should have known better, the
leavening presence of these values within society should
serve as an ultimate support, rather like oaken pit-props
in a mine when the rock is shifting.
If any change needs to be made, it is in the
institutional environment in which most scientists are
constrained to work, which nowadays regrettably tends
to be dominated by a bureaucratic administration not
sharing these values. This environment includes the state
research councils providing the majority of the funding
necessary for nearly all experimental and much
theoretical work. Although these councils are mostly
staffed by former researchers, their view of science is,
inevitably, coloured by bureaucratic (“bean counting”, as
some of my colleagues would less politely put it)
exigencies (one such staff member, when asked about
the possibility of extending a large grant by a modest sum
to allow some work to be completed, told me that “the
requirements for justifying spending £10 are as stringent
as for justifying spending £10 million”).
Possible reasons why many scientists are forced to
labour under the unnecessary burden of this layer of
bureaucracy have been discussed at length elsewhere:
here let it suffice to remark that if economy of
expenditure is now necessary (although at a time when
milliards of currency units are being poured into banking
black holes the very phrase “economy of expenditure”
has become meaningless), the most obvious route would
be to abolish the research councils. Lest the public and
government ministers become alarmed at the possibility
of scientists thereafter wasting their time on trivia, let
them bear in mind that it is anyway part of the duty of a
scientist that he or she should only work on problems of
importance, something that was vividly impressed on me
as an undergraduate by Sir Peter Medawar in his lecture
“Advice to a young scientist”.
If a single phrase had to be found to describe the
present global illness, it would be “short-termism”. Given
that the whole ethos of science is directed towards
distant goals, seeking after remote rather than proximate
causes—in other words, “long-termism”—strengthening
the leavening influence of this ethos throughout society
cannot but do good. This would include emphasizing the
importance, indeed necessity, of examining problems
over multiple time scales, from the shortest to the longest.
I am doubtless echoing others when in addition I stress
the importance of looking at things from a fundamental
viewpoint in order to find workable solutions. At the same
time I would emphatically repudiate the movement to give
scientists a direct rôle in managing affairs—Plato’s idea
of the “philosopher-king”—although there are distinguished
examples of scientists having acquitted themselves in a
highly honourable fashion as members of a government,
overall there seems to be little to commend any special
preference being shown for scientists in this regard.
Leaving aside the “philosopher-king” idea then, the
purpose of this editorial is to animate some definite
suggestions for alleviating the global crisis. One very
obvious (to the scientists) action is for scholars engaged
in the humanities (e.g., history) and more practically-
oriented subjects such as economics to open their minds
to new approaches deriving their inspiration from the
methods of the natural sciences. Most journals are at
present closed to such new approaches. A correspondent
recently reported that a paper of his describing a
physicist’s approach to the analysis of economic growth
(written in collaboration with a bone fide economist, who
also cosigned the paper) submitted to the venerable
Journal of Political Economy received the following
response from the Editor: “The paper does not do justice
to the large empirical literature on economic growth.”
This seems to be typical, and a sure way of ensuring that
new ideas that might make the aforesaid large
accumulation of empirical literature appear slightly
ridiculous would never get a hearing. Why editors should
be afraid to even publish such papers is a mystery: surely
if the ideas put forward were erroneous there would be
an abundance of scholars willing to demonstrate the error
of thought and analysis. That is how knowledge advances,
not by suppressing the very publication of novelty.
Strikingly, there seems to be a distinct asymmetry in
this regard between the humanities and the natural
sciences. The journal Complexus (which, as readers of
the previous issue of JBPC will know, has now been
absorbed by us) published not only papers modelling
biological systems, but also social systems. One does not,
however, know how influential these papers have been
among the community of social scientists. Sometimes
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such excursions tend to somewhat discredit the natural
scientists involved in them, as happened with the field
characterized by the absurd and distasteful term
“econophysics”. If it means anything at all, it seems to
revolve around the Black-Scholes model in one way or
another, but given the dubious validity of the assumptions
made regarding human behaviour, it strays too far into
the territory of pseudoscientific thought for either
physicists or economists to feel truly at ease about it. At
best, one can say that this “discipline” has provided an
arena for publishing (in certain physics journals) some
rather mediocre ideas about economics that would
presumably never have been judged to be of sufficient
interest to be accepted in economics journals. But leaving
aside that perhaps rather unfortunate excursion into the
social sciences, there is plenty of unexplored territory
around. However, a minimum ingredient for success
must be the explicit recognition that such work involves
human values, and if the selected values are bad, then the
outcomes are also likely to be bad. Surely no-one can
now deny that the outcome for the world financial system
has been very bad indeed, and it is unlikely to be a
coincidence that the values of the protagonists in some
of the biggest collapses are the very antithesis of the
sort of thing we should be teaching our children.
Just as life forms have evolved to produce greater
and greater complexity while maintaining niches for the
simplest forms, science also seems to have evolved in
that direction. This seems to be healthy and inevitable. It
is perhaps ironical that while any system involving human
beings is surely more complex than any inanimate system,
a deep appreciation of complexity is to be found among a
still small community of natural scientists rather than
among social scientists. The most urgent need is for this
appreciation to diffuse far more widely than hitherto. The
artificially simplifying assumptions imposed upon
conceptions of the world by a wrongly conceived desire
to simplify has led to a world view far inferior to the
seemingly intuitive wisdom possessed by sages of old,
such as the author of the Daodejing.
Diversity and vitality are inseparable, and even the
greatest complexity seems to need the coexistence of a
kind of simplicity in order to maintain the greatest possible
overall diversity; this simplicity cannot be encompassed
within the complexity itself, but needs to have its own
autonomous existence and characteristic forms.
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